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President Donald Trump’s Trade War 
Multilateralism at Risk 
Arvind Panagariya 
The global trading system, with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its 
center, has been under stress for more than a decade.1  The Doha Round of trade 
negotiations failed to make progress beyond the Trade Facilitation Agreement.  This has 
led many to ask whether the WTO can sustain the open trading system, which it and its 
predecessor institution, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, have helped spawn.  
The challenge to the open trading system has reached a new height following the election 
of President Donald Trump in the United States.  Under him, trade tensions have turned 
into a trade war of sorts, which threatens to bring down the entire multilateral trading 
system. The question now being asked is not whether conflicting interests of major 
trading nations would damage the system—that damage has already begun—but whether 
a different future leadership in the United States would be able to repair that damage and 
return the system to its healthier self. 
The sources of stress in the trading system and possible solutions, if any, 
constitute the core of this paper.  Before we get to that discussion, however, it is useful to 
take a brief stock of the history of the evolution of the global trading system.  This 
stocktaking would help us appreciate that the road to achieving and maintaining a liberal 
trading system has always been bumpy.  And yet, we have achieved unprecedented 
progress in creating and nurturing a highly open trading system. This liberal trading 
1 This paper builds on some of my earlier work, most notably, Panagariya (2013) and Bhagwati, Krishna 
and Panagariya (2016). 
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system has brought unprecedented prosperity around the world and is therefore worth 
every bit of our effort to preserve it. 
1. Brief History of the Evolution of the Global Trading System 
 The year 1870 is generally accepted as the heralding of the First Globalization.  A 
network of bilateral agreements between different pairs of Western European nations had 
resulted in substantial liberalization of trade within Western Europe, by far the most 
prosperous region of the world at the time.  Inspired by the Anglo-French Cobden-
Chevalier treaty of 1860, the agreements had built into them a Most Favored Nation 
(MFN) clause.  Accordingly, each signatory country to a bilateral agreement recognized 
the other signatory country as its Most Favored Nation (MFN), whereby it committed to 
granting the latter any future tariff concessions granted by it to third countries.  As more 
of such agreements were signed, more countries enjoyed the benefits of tariff reduction 
and the cost of not having such agreements rose.  In turn, this induced more and more 
countries to sign them.   
 Outside Europe, self-interested colonial powers also forced full or near-full free 
trade on their colonies, principally in Asia and Africa.  Motivation of the colonial powers 
in this respect was clear: they wanted free access to the markets of their colonies even as 
they themselves imposed tariffs on imports from the latter. European nations also obliged 
China and Japan to adopt very liberal trade policies through treaties forced on them by 
wars. Only the Americas remained regions with high levels of protection. 
 Facilitated by a liberal trade regime around the world, years 1870-1914 saw the 
western world grow by leaps and bounds.2 But the First World War put an end to both the 
                                                
2  Because the policies within the colonies were largely designed to exploit them to the benefit of the 
respective colonial masters, they did not do so well. 
 3 
liberal economic order and the rapid expansion of the western economies. The war itself 
contributed to the disruption of trade and proliferation of many tariff and non-tariff 
barriers. Moreover, the general atmosphere of mutual distrust and absence of the spirit of 
cooperation that followed the war gave rise to yet more barriers.  Countries that returned 
to the gold standard after the war also found deflation in partner countries feeding into 
their economies and resorted to trade barriers to insulate themselves from such deflation.  
Like the Americas, Europe too now became heavily protected.   
 During the inter-war period, many of the colonies and independent Asian 
countries such as China and Japan acquired or recovered the ability to conduct their own 
trade policies.  Protectionist impulses led these countries to raise trade barriers as well. 
The infamous Smoot-Hawley tariffs added to the already high level of protection in the 
United States in 1929.  These tariffs resulted in a significant increase in protection to both 
agricultural and industrial products.  With partner countries such as Canada, France, Italy, 
Spain and Switzerland retaliating, global protection rose yet more. In 1932, even the 
United Kingdom introduced a 10 percent tariff on a wide variety of products. With Hitler 
taking the helm in Germany in 1933, that country saw the implementation of quantitative 
controls on foreign trade in pursuit of self-sufficiency. 
 Some reversal of this movement toward protection finally began after Franklin D. 
Roosevelt won the 1932 presidential election in the United States and appointed pro-free 
trade Cordell Hull as his secretary of state.  In 1934, the U.S. Congress passed the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, which authorized the Executive to conclude trade 
agreements with partner countries.  This was the first time that the Congress delegated its 
tariff-making authority to the Executive.  Until this happened, the Congress had set tariffs 
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unilaterally, which left no room for negotiation for lower tariffs in the partner countries.  
The advantage of delegation of the authority to the Executive was that it allowed the 
latter to seek tariff concessions from partner countries in return for lower tariffs by the 
United States. By 1939, the United States had signed twenty treaties covering 60 percent 
of its trade.  These treaties brought American average tariffs down from more than 50 
percent to less than 40 percent.  But the liberalization process was abruptly brought to a 
halt by the breakout of the Second World War.3 
 As the Second World War drew to a close, the United States, assisted by the 
United Kingdom, began efforts to restore international financial stability, begin post-war 
reconstruction and development and promote a liberal trading environment.  These efforts 
proceeded along two separate but parallel tracks.  On the first track, discussions were 
held to create the post-war financial and development institutions.  They culminated in 
the 1945 Bretton Woods Conference, which gave birth to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) to oversee international financial system and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development—more popularly known as the World Bank—to 
promote post-war reconstruction and development. 
 On the second track, the United Nations Economic and Social Council kick 
started the efforts to draw up a charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO), 
which would implement an agreed upon set of rules relating to international flow of 
goods.4  For this purpose it established a Preparatory Committee of twenty-three nations 
in 1946. The Preparatory Committee drafted the charter, which came to be known as the 
                                                
3 The facts and data up to this point in the present section are taken from Findlay and O’Rourke (2007 395-
402 and 443-55).  
4 The history of the failed attempt to create the ITO and founding of the GATT is based on the WTO online 
press brief “Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral Trading System” available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm (accessed on July 31 2018). 
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Havana Charter.  On March 24, 1948, 56 countries including the United States signed the 
Charter at a conference held in Havana. Unfortunately, the United States Congress chose 
not to ratify the Havana Charter with the result that the ITO was stillborn. 
 Interestingly, however, during April to October 1947, with the discussions for the 
ITO Charter still under way, the twenty-three members of the Preparatory Committee had 
gone on to negotiate some 45,000 tariff concessions covering $10 billion worth of trade 
among themselves. On October 30, 1947, these nations signed an agreement titled the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to make the negotiated tariff reductions 
effective beginning on January 1, 1948.  The agreement was intended as an interim 
measure with the Havana Charter drafted later in a manner that subsumed it. 
 With the ITO failing to come to life, however, the GATT evolved into a de facto 
institution to not only implement the tariff concessions that had been agreed at the time of 
its signing but also serve as the umbrella for future negotiations for trade liberalization.  
This informal institution, with an office in Geneva, went on to promote and nurture a 
liberal global trading system for nearly fifty years.  The same rules that had imparted 
permanence to the 45,000 original tariff concessions came to govern future rounds of 
trade negotiations conducted under GATT auspices. A total of as many as eight rounds of 
negotiations, spread over a period of almost fifty years, were conducted and successfully 
completed. The last of these rounds—the Uruguay Round (UR)—culminated in the 
GATT mutating into the WTO. Beginning on January 1, 1995, the global trading system 
came to be governed by the “WTO rules” brought into force by the UR Agreement. The 
WTO became the institution to oversee the implementation of these rules. 
 6 
 The UR Agreement was a watershed in the history of global trading system.  It 
not only created the powerful formal institution of the WTO in place of the low-profile 
informal institution of the GATT, it also brought agriculture, services and intellectual 
property rights centrally into the fold of enforceable multilateral rules.  Furthermore, it 
created a strong dispute settlement body whose rulings were binding on all members.  
Finally, having genuinely participated in the exchange of concessions in the UR 
negotiations, developing countries became active participants in the new institution.  
2. A Highly Open Trading System 
 With news stories focusing on trade tensions among WTO members dominating 
the conventional and social media, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the past seventy 
years have seen the world steadily moving toward the most open trading system in human 
history. Indeed, during the last two decades, the global economy has been more open than 
in any other era.  True, we have failed to make a success of the Doha Round.  But that 
should not distract us from the fact that we have fully implemented the UR Agreements 
thereby bringing three major areas—agriculture, services and intellectual property—
within the fold of multilateral discipline.  The WTO as an institution has gained full 
legitimacy with all member countries, small and large, accepting the rulings by its dispute 
settlement body.  Alongside, countries have undertaken massive liberalization.  For the 
first time, developing countries have opted for trade liberalization in their own interest.  
 To underline the extent of liberalization achieved, begin by noting that protection-
motivated non-tariff barriers, which had plagued the system until as recently as the 
1980s, are virtually gone. Tariffs exist but they too have come significantly down. Table 
1, which reports some indicators of tariffs on industrial products in selected major 
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economies from different parts of the world, illustrates this point. According to it, 
developed countries have come to bind virtually all their tariff lines. Developing 
countries have not reached the same stage but they too have bound a significant 
proportion of their tariff lines.  More importantly, applied tariffs in the developed 
countries have dropped to historically the lowest levels. Average applied tariffs in these 
countries are uniformly below five percent.  Unlike during the First Globalization, the 
United States and Canada are highly open today.   
 Developing countries maintain higher tariffs than they did during the First 
Globalization, but this anomaly is due to the fact that colonial powers had forced free 
trade in the colonies to serve their own interests.  Considering that the developing 
countries now choose their own trade policies, their protection levels too have 
dramatically declined relative to the levels they had adopted at independence in the 
immediate post-Second World War years.  In India, which is often depicted as a highly 
protected country, the simple average of applied industrial tariffs stands at 10.7 percent.  
This is only slightly higher than the 8.8 percent average tariff in China.  Though tariffs in 
some Latin American countries (Argentina and Brazil) and Africa are higher, even they 
are below 15 percent on average.   
 The proportion of applied tariff rates exceeding 15 percent is also generally low.  
In Asia, this proportion is uniformly below 12 percent.  Remarkably, at 9.4 percent, this 
proportion in India is significantly below 11.9 percent observed in China.  In the 
developed countries, the proportion is uniformly well below 3 percent with Canada being 
the major exception.  Continuing exceptions are some of the countries in Latin America 
and Africa. 
 8 
 Agriculture is protected at a higher level than industrial products.  Nevertheless, 
progress in liberalizing this sector has been among the most important developments in 
recent years.  For decades, this sector had remained effectively outside the GATT 
discipline.  But the UR Agreement successfully brought it under multilateral discipline 
with some progress made towards its liberalization as well.  Table 2 provides some 
indicators of tariffs in agriculture.  All member countries have bound all tariff lines in 
agriculture.  As of 2017, average applied tariffs stand at 5.3 and 10.8 percent in the 
United States and European Union, respectively.  Protection in many countries in other 
parts of the world is significantly higher, however.  Export subsides, which had been 
highly contentious at the launch of the Doha Round, have been entirely eliminated.  Even 
domestic agricultural subsidies have seen a significant decline in the United States and 
European Union from their levels at the time of the launch of the Doha Round. 
 Finally, both the attitude and actual trade policy towards services trade have been 
transformed compared with the situation that prevailed at the time of the launch of the 
Uruguay Round. So opposed were the developing countries to negotiations in this area 
that they insisted on keeping them out of the core negotiating agenda, which constituted a 
single undertaking.  At their insistence, services-trade negotiating agenda was relegated 
to a separate track.  Yet, services trade is now centrally within the multilateral trading 
system with the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) governing it. Most 
developing countries are now keen to attract foreign investment in services and have 
undertaken substantial liberalization in this area through domestic policy reform. India, 
China and many other developing countries are now highly open to foreign investors in 
services.  
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 Growth in the world trade has mirrored this liberalization.  This is seen in Figure 
1, which depicts the total world exports for selected years from 1948 to 2016.  In 1948, 
world exports amounted to just $59 billion.  They rose to $157 billion in 1963 and then 
more than tripled during 1963-73 as well as 1973-83. Even after 1983, despite a very 
large base, exports have been approximately doubling every decade.  By 2016, 
merchandise exports had reached 15.5 trillion.  Exports of commercial services amounted 
to another $4.8 trillion.  Therefore, the total exports in 2016 stood at an unprecedented 
$20.3 trillion. 
 
Figure 1: World merchandise exports, 1948 to 2016 
Source: Author’s construction using data from the WTO 
 A key point that deserves repeating and elaborated upon is that the recent decades 
have seen the developing countries voluntarily embrace liberal trade policies and benefit 



















from it.  While the fact of liberalization by these countries is well recognized, their 
success in achieving high growth under these liberal policies has not received equivalent 
attention.  Few commentators recognize that the claims by authors such as Dani Rodrik 
and Ha-Joon Chang that import substitution decades of the 1960s and 1970s had 
produced the best outcomes for the developing countries have been overturned by the 
stellar performance of these countries during the more liberal decades following mid 
1990s.5 
 Given that even during the 1960s and 1970s the best performing countries—the 
Asian tigers including South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong—achieved 
miracle-level growth by embracing outward-oriented policies, the claims of Rodrik and 
Chang should have been suspect from the beginning.  But the more recent performance of 
a large number of countries in different parts of the world must put to rest any lingering 
doubts about the power of outward orientation.  Table 3 lists fifteen countries from 
Africa, fifteen from Asia and six from Latin America that experienced annual growth 
rates of five percent or higher during 2004-13.6  Most of these countries also saw rapid 
growth in the preceding decade, 1994-2003.  Such high growth rates for extended periods 
in such a large number of countries have never been seen in recorded history in any 
earlier period.  In my forthcoming book, Free Trade and Prosperity: How Openness 
Helps the Developing Countries Grow Richer and Combat Poverty, I document that each 
of these growth episodes has taken place alongside progressively liberal trade policies. 
                                                
5 Rodrik 1999, ch. 4 and Ha-Joon Chang 2007, 27. 
6 Only Botswana in Africa and Chile and Costa Rica in Latin America in Table 3 miss the five percent 
growth mark during 2004-13 by a hair’s breadth.  I have, nevertheless, included these countries in the table 
because of the sustained growth they have achieved over several decades.   
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3. Early Fissures in the System  
 The First World War triggered the end to the liberal order of the First 
Globalization.  It was inevitable that disruptions to supply chains, diversion of transport 
infrastructure to meet the demands of the war and strategic trade restrictions would 
undermine the liberal order.  Seen in this context, the challenges to the current Second 
Globalization are altogether different.  At the heart of the current challenges are 
distributional conflicts, both internal and external.  Internal conflicts, especially 
applicable to the developed countries, relate to perceptions that benefits of openness have 
accrued disproportionately to those at the top end of income and wealth distributions 
while those at the bottom end of the distributions have been actually damaged.  External 
conflicts have been triggered by a sense on the part of certain nations that benefits of 
opening up have gone disproportionately to their trading partners.  This is the dimension 
that particularly dominates the current prickly relationship between the United States and 
China. 
 Some of the challenges to multilateral trading system had begun to emerge even 
as the negotiations for the creation of the WTO were reaching a successful conclusion. 
Subsequently, some of these challenges have become more acute while new challenges 
have emerged as well.  In this section, I summarize these earlier challenges, leaving the 
latest ones, whose origin is more closely tied to the current United States administration, 
for the next section. 
3.1. Preferential Trade Agreements  
 At the heart of the WTO is the MFN clause of the GATT and GATS, which 
stipulates that the member countries must not discriminate among their trading partners in 
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setting their trade policies.  The beauty of this principle is that when a member country 
enters a bargain with one or more member countries for mutual reduction in trade 
barriers, the reductions so negotiated become automatically applicable to all member 
countries.  The principle thus results in liberalization on a wider scale than would be the 
case if liberalization were limited to members negotiating the reductions in barriers.  It 
also ensures that the tariff on a product charged by a country is the same regardless of the 
country from which it came. 
 Unfortunately, however, the GATT article XXIV (and GATS article V) gives 
preferential trade areas (PTAs), which free up substantially all trade between two or more 
WTO members, exemption from the MFN principle.  That is to say, this article allows 
two or more member countries to remove trade barriers against one another without 
offering these reductions to other WTO members as long as the removal of barriers 
among them is complete (i.e., tariffs and quotas are eliminated rather than partially 
liberalized) and cover substantially all products.       
 Originally, in 1947 when the GATT was signed, this accommodation was made in 
the expectation that only a handful of countries would form such arrangements.  This 
indeed remained true until mid 1980s with the European Economic Community, 
European Free Trade Area and South African Customs Union being the only truly 
effective PTAs.  Global trading system remained uncluttered with each country 
maintaining a single tariff on any given product.7  An important motivating factor for 
countries to steer clear of PTAs was that the United States remained fully committed to 
multilateral liberalization and refused to enter such arrangements. 
                                                
7 Under the generalized System of Preferences, developed countries did give trade preferences to the 
developing but these were usually in the form of complete exemption and therefore created minimal clutter.  
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 This state of affairs changed in mid 1980s, however. Even as the United States 
tried to persuade the European Economic Community, which had been distracted by its 
Single Market project, to launch a new round of GATT negotiations, it decided to 
simultaneously pursue PTAs.  In 1986, it signed the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement and proceeded to open negotiations with Mexico to convert the agreement 
with Canada into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).   
 The decision by the United States to engage in bilateral and plurilateral deals had 
a profound effect on the global trading system.  One by one, all WTO member countries 
came to the view that they could not be left behind in the race to from PTAs.  As Figure 2 
shows, once the NAFTA began to turn into reality, PTA activity exploded.  Today, the 
number of PTAs runs into hundreds. All WTO members have signed on to one or more 
PTAs and some such as Chile and Mexico are participants in a dozen or more 
arrangements.  Figure 3 further testifies to the multiplicity of the arrangements in every 
single region of the world today. 
 In the early phase of proliferation of PTAs, many influential economists had 
passionately argued that these arrangements were WTO plus and that they complemented 
trade liberalization agenda of the GATT-WTO system.8  But it is now clear that they have 
ended up fragmenting the trading system by greatly undermining the MFN principle.  We 
have created what Jagdish Bhagwati has called the spaghetti bowl of tariffs whereby 
tariff rates now depend on the rules of origin and the stage of implementation of the PTA 
with the country from which a given product is imported. 
                                                
8 For example, see the contributions by Dornbusch and Krugman in De Melo and Panagariya (1993) and 
Summers (1991).  
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 Figure 2: Evolution of PTAs, 1948-2018  
Source: WTO at  http://rtais.wto.org/UI/charts.aspx  (accessed on August 5, 2018) 
Figure 3: Physical (goods) RTAs in force, August 5, 2018 
Source WTO at http://rtais.wto.org/UI/Charts.aspx (accessed on August 5, 2018)  
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 More importantly, PTAs have weakened the will of the influential WTO members 
to negotiate in earnest at the multilateral forum.  Larger countries find it easier to extract 
concessions in one-on-one bargains with smaller and weaker countries.  Export interests, 
especially in the developed countries, find that they can cut better deals within PTAs 
since those damaged by such deals, namely non-members, are not represented on the 
negotiating table.  This is even truer of developed country lobbies seeking concessions on 
non-trade subjects such as intellectual property rights and labor standards. As long as 
larger and stronger developing countries such as India, China and Brazil, which oppose 
linking non-trade subjects with trade, are not participants in the PTAs, concessions on 
these subjects can be extracted from other developing countries. 
 PTAs also allow the richer countries to maintain distortions in agriculture that can 
only be addressed genuinely in multilateral context.  As an example, staying away from 
multilateral negotiations allows the United States to maintain cotton subsidies 
indefinitely.  Cotton clothing exporters such as Bangladesh are happy to buy cotton at 
lower prices that result from cotton subsidies. At the same time, small and poorer cotton 
exporters in West African countries and India, which lose from low cotton prices, are 
unable to challenge those subsidies. 
  The latest trend has been toward larger PTAs.  Two such PTAs have been under 
negotiation: Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP).  As it stands, twelve countries including the United States originally 
signed the former agreement.  But while the United States has now withdrawn from it, 
other eleven countries have moved ahead with its implementation.  TTIP, on the other 
 16 
hand, has not yet got off the ground and it is unlikely that it will make progress during the 
tenure of President Trump.  
3.2. Emergence of Large Developing Country Players 
 Negotiations for the Doha Round were also complicated by the emergence of 
several large developing countries, namely, Brazil, China, India and Indonesia.  These 
countries have been growing rapidly and therefore are expected to grow yet larger in the 
near future. As it happens, despite having undertaken considerable liberalization, 
countries such as China and India continue to have higher levels of average protection 
than the developed countries.  This asymmetry, complemented by the expectation of a 
future large market in these emerging market economies, has given rise to complications 
in bargaining that had not been experienced in the past. 
 Till the Tokyo Round, which concluded in 1979, multilateral negotiations were 
confined to the developed countries, with the developing countries benefiting from 
whatever liberalization the former agreed to undertake.  Interests of the developed 
countries were broadly aligned and once the Quad counties—United States, European 
Economic Community, Japan and Canada—agreed to a deal, an agreement could be 
reached.  But beginning with the Uruguay Round, the developed countries insisted that 
the developing countries also make liberalizing commitments.  This inclusion had already 
made the negotiations for the UR Agreement very difficult and many experts had begun 
to prematurely announce the death of GATT.  But in the end, the negotiation could 
succeed because of the tactical decision by the developed countries to create the new 
institution of the WTO midway through the negotiations.  This meant that those choosing 
to stay out of the WTO would face the prospect of losing the MFN status vis-à-vis those 
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joining it.  No country could afford to incur the loss associated with such exclusion.  
Therefore, all negotiating countries signed the final deal.  
 The threat of being left out of the WTO is no loner there now.  Moreover, in 2001, 
China, by far the largest single developing country, was granted entry into the institution 
as well. Other developing countries such as Brazil, India and Indonesia have grown 
further and therefore have significantly greater heft than at the time of the UR 
negotiations.  These developments combined with the fact that developed and developing 
country interests are far less aligned than was the case with developed countries alone has 
made multilateral negotiations more difficult. 
 The levels of protection in the developing countries are also significantly higher 
than those in the developed countries.  Moreover, in many cases their applied tariffs are 
far lower than their bound tariffs.  Given this asymmetry, developed countries insist that 
the developing countries lower their tariff bindings proportionately far more than them to 
harmonize the tariffs across countries.  The developing countries take the view that the 
reductions should be proportionately equal, which would, of course, leave the developing 
country tariffs much higher. This too creates an impasse in negotiations. 
3.3. The Rise of Multinationals  
 Multilateral negotiations have been further hampered by the emergence of large 
multinationals on a scale never previously experienced.  This development has 
undermined multilateral negotiations in two ways.  First, in the United States, export-
oriented businesses have usually served as pro-liberalization lobby group.  But 
multinationals have their production bases in multiple countries.  They gain from 
protection in these countries.  Therefore, their appetite to lobby the United States Trade 
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Representative (USTR) for liberalization in the countries in which they have production 
bases has declined.  This factor has contributed to a general lack of enthusiasm on the 
part of the United States business lobbies at the USTR.  This problem is far less acute in 
the PTA context.  Second and related, there has also been a decline in the credibility of 
the multinationals with the USTR since the latter cannot be sure as to which country’s 
interests they would lobby for: the United States or the countries in which they have 
operations. 
3.4. Withdrawal by the United States from the Leadership Role 
 The decision by the United States to withdraw from championing the cause of 
multilateral trade liberalization has further undermined success in multilateral 
negotiations.  In July 2008, prospects for a deal on the Doha Round had looked good.  
But in the end, the United States’ insistence on zero-for-zero tariffs in certain sectors on 
top of the agreed upon formula based tariff reductions in industrial products on the one 
hand and the Indian demand for a Special Safeguard in agriculture on the other resulted 
in a collapse of the talks.   
 Subsequently, President Barack Obama and his USTR showed little interest in 
advancing the Doha negotiations.  Indeed, Obama hardly ever mentioned the word 
“Doha” during his presidency though he went on to complete at least three free trade 
agreements, one with South Korea, another with Colombia and the mega deal of TTP 
with eleven other countries.  The refrain of lower-level officials in the administration 
during those years had been that China, which now has the largest share in the world 
market for manufactures, should lead the process.  But that is a non-starter.  As a result, 
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the only progress in multilateral negotiations that took place was the conclusion of the 
Trade Facilitation Agreement at Bali Ministerial Conference in December 2013.  
4. Trump Tariffs: The Great Disruption 
 Fissures in the trading system I have described in the previous section are of a 
longer-term nature and have been with us for some time.  But more recently, under 
President Donald Trump, much deeper and wider cracks have appeared in the multilateral 
trading system.  Whereas the older fissures had impeded further progress in multilateral 
negotiations, the current cracks pose an existential threat to multilateral trading systems.  
 Trade dispute under both GATT and WTO were of a nature that they could be 
resolved within the rules governing these institutions.  Member countries placed the 
preservation of the system above all else and therefore abided by the rulings.  In general, 
members also avoided raising trade barriers except under various safeguard provisions of 
the GATT-WTO agreements.  And when violations occurred, countries generally sought 
relief through mediation via the GATT and WTO instead of retaliating unilaterally.  But 
trade actions of the current United States administration have a strong unilateral flavor 
since the GATT came into existence.  Sadly, it may also lack an acceptable remedy via 
the dispute settlement process of the WTO.  
4.1. Steel and Aluminum Tariffs and National Security Exception in GATT 
 On March 8, 2018, the United States imposed 25 percent tariff on steel imports 
and 10 percent tariff on aluminum imports.  Initially, Canada, Mexico and EU were given 
exemption but the exemption was withdrawn on June 1, 2018.  Five large WTO 
members—China, Turkey, Mexico, Canada and EU—have now retaliated against these 
tariffs.  China took action on April 2, 2018 levying 25 percent tariff on food imports 
 20 
worth $3 billion from the United States.  Mexico imposed 15 to 25 percent duties on 
bourbon, apples, potatoes, cheese and pork on June 5, 2018.  Turkey responded with 
tariffs ranging from 4 to 70 percent on $265.5 million worth of imports from the United 
States on June 21, 2018.  Products subject to the tariffs included automobiles, whiskey, 
tobacco, coal, cosmetics, machinery equipment, paper, and petrochemical products.  EU 
responded on June 22, 2018 with 25 percent tariff on $3 billion worth of imports 
including items such as bourbon, corn and Harley-Davidson.  Canada imposed tariffs on 
imports worth $12.5 billion from the United States on July 1, 2018.  It applied 25 percent 
duty to more than 40 US steel products and 10 percent duty on over 80 other items 
including toffee, maple syrup, coffee beans and strawberry jam.   
 Domestically, the administration justified its action on steel and aluminum under 
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which gives the President authority to 
impose trade restrictions on national security grounds.  Internationally, it has relied on 
GATT article XXI, which allows member countries to take actions otherwise in violation 
of GATT rules on national security grounds.  But there are potential legal problems with 
the actions under the domestic as well as international rules.  
 Domestically, the American Institute for International Steel (AIIS)—a coalition of 
U.S. steel users—and two steel trading companies have filed a complaint in the United 
States Court of International Trade questioning the constitutionality of the tariffs.  Filed 
on June 27, 2018 the lawsuit notes that Article I of the Constitution gives the authority to 
set custom duties to the Congress.  It goes on to argue that the delegation of this authority 
on national security grounds under Section 232 of Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is 
unconstitutional.  The logic behind the argument is that the definition of “national 
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security” in Section 232 provides no “intelligible principle” that would circumscribe the 
President’s authority.  For example, the statute does not require the President to consider 
whether the products are imported from close allies; or that the imports being subject to 
tariffs are used to manufacture weapons or other products that aid national security; or 
that retaliation by partner countries could result in damage to national security. 
 Internationally, the United States steel tariffs raise an even more serious problem. 
In principle, the tariffs can be justified under GATT Article XXI, which permits such 
action on national security grounds.  The key relevant provision in this article states: 
 “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed … to prevent any contracting 
party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests … taken in time of war or other emergency in 
international relations.”  
The United States and many legal scholars of the WTO take the view that this provision 
allows any member country to take any trade policy action necessary to protect its 
national security interests and only the member has the authority to determine what is 
required to protect its national security.  Judgment of the member in this respect cannot 
be challenged.  Most recently, the United States has expressed this view in its third-party 
oral statement in the on-going WTO dispute that Ukraine has brought against Russia.9 
 This interpretation of the relevant provision in GATT Article XXI is plausible.  
For the purpose of the article is to allow member countries utmost flexibility in their trade 
                                                
9 The relevant part of the oral statement by the United States says, “On its face, the text establishes two 
crucial points: first, nothing in the GATT 1994 prevents a Member from taking any action needed to 
protect an essential security interest; and second, the action necessary for the protection of its 
essential security interests is that ‘which it considers necessary for’ such protection. That is, a Member has 
the discretion and responsibility to make the serious determination, with attendant political ramifications, of 
what is required to protect the security of its nation and citizens.” For further details, see 
<http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/litigating-gatt-article-xxi-the-us-view-of-the-scope-
of-the-exception.html> (accessed on August 7, 2018).   
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policies in times of war or war-like emergencies. Faced with threats to national security, a 
member country will find itself unable to live by its normal WTO obligations. Under 
such circumstances, if it were not given an exemption from the latter, it will face 
retaliatory actions from all around.  In turn, this prospect would discourage the country 
from joining the WTO in the first place. Blanket exemption is the only way to persuade 
countries to be a part of the WTO system. 
 This being said, there is also an expectation that member countries will use the 
provision with great discretion and not abuse it to justify protectionist actions taken for 
reasons other than national security.  Use of the security exception to defend violations of 
WTO rules that did not originate in a threat to national security are bound to result in 
serious systemic risk. Such actions by one country will lead the damaged countries to 
take retaliatory actions. And if retaliation were followed by counter-retaliation, we would 
get into a vicious cycle of retaliatory tariffs, which may bring the entire edifice of the 
WTO down.  Current U.S. tariffs and retaliatory actions by other countries constitute 
precisely this kind of systemic threat. 
 As it stands, a number of countries including China, Canada, Mexico, and EU 
have separately filed complaints in the WTO dispute settlement body stating that the 
United States steel and aluminum tariffs violate their WTO rights.  These complaints 
effectively question the applicability of Article XXI to the United States steel and 
aluminum tariffs.  The United States has in turn filed similar complaints against all five 
countries that have imposed retaliatory tariffs.   
 While the official stance of the United States is that it has imposed tariffs on steel 
and aluminum on national security grounds, it is not clear under which WTO provision 
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China, Canada, Mexico, Turkey and EU have taken their “retaliatory” trade policy 
actions.  Ironically, in strictly legal terms, while the United States steel and aluminum 
tariffs have a good chance of passing muster under the national security clause, 
retaliatory actions by China, EU, Canada, Mexico and Turkey are clearly in violation of 
the WTO rules.  Article 23.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding is unequivocal that 
countries whose trading rights are damaged by other WTO members must not take 
retaliatory action unilaterally.  They must bring the matter to the WTO dispute settlement 
body.  In effect, within the WTO rules, the United States has a better case against the 
retaliating countries than the latter do against the United States. 
4.2. Unilateral Tariffs by the United States on Imports from China 
 On July 6, 2018 the United States decided to take further unilateral trade policy 
action. This time, it imposed a 25 percent tariff on Chinese imports worth $34 billion. 
China responded the same day with its own tariffs at the same rate on imports of equal 
value from the United States.  On August 2, 2018, the United States threatened another 
round of 25 percent tariffs on imports worth $200 billion from China to which China 
responded with its own counter-threat of tariffs on imports worth $60 billion from the 
United States.  Subsequently, the United States issued another list of imports from China 
worth $16 billion on which it imposed a 25 percent tariff beginning on August 23, 2018.  
China immediately announced retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United States of 
equivalent worth at the rate of 25 percent. 
 The United States has exchanged similar threats with the European Union.  
Though a truce was declared between the two sides after President Trump and President 
Jean-Claude Juncker of the European Commission on July 25, 2018, the threat of tariffs 
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and counter-tariffs between the two sides remains.  In a recent interview to Bloomberg, 
President Trump has stated that the European union is “as restrictive as any single 
country in the world including China.” He accused the European Union of having a wall 
against the United States agricultural exports and of using technical standards to block its 
exports of medical equipment.  He further stated that consumer habits in the European 
Union are such that they do not buy American automobiles. As a result, even the 
elimination of tariff on American automobiles by the European Union will not be good 
enough for the United States.  The threat of a trade war between the United States and 
Europe thus looms.10    
 The United States has imposed tariffs on China under Section 301 of the Trade 
Act of 1974.  Section 301 gives the USTR broad authority to respond to a foreign 
country’s unfair trade practices. Upon affirmative determination of actionable conduct, 
USTR has the authority to take all appropriate and feasible action to obtain the 
elimination of the foreign country’s act, policy, or practice, subject to the direction of the 
President. The statute allows for actions within the President’s power with respect to 
trade in goods or services, or any other area.  The USTR has announced the tariffs on 
imports from China upon determination that the latter’s forced technology transfer rules 
and other industrial policies give Chinese companies unfair access to the R&D and 
business know-how of U.S. companies operating in China. 
 While the U.S. action, thus, has a legal basis within its domestic laws, it lacks 
such a basis under the WTO rules.  A dispute brought by the EU in 1999 at the WTO led 
to a WTO ruling in January 2000 making trade sanctions against a WTO member under 
                                                
10 Transcript of the Bloomberg interview may be found at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
08-31/president-donald-trump-interviewed-by-bloomberg-news-transcript.   
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Section 301 WTO illegal.  Though the United States did impose trade sanctions under 
Section 301 on Ukraine in December 2001, the latter was not a member of the WTO at 
the time.  Since China is a WTO member, any Section 301 actions against it are in 
violation of its WTO rights. 
 China has already filed a challenge to Section 301 tariffs at the WTO.  The United 
States has not made it clear under which WTO provisions it proposes to defend its 
actions. As far as I can see, the only option it has is to once again invoke the national 
security exception.  If it does so, what has been said above about steel and aluminum 
tariffs regarding WTO legality of the tariffs by the two sides would apply to these tariffs 
as well. 
5. Deeper Concerns of the United States 
 Throughout the post-Second World War history, the key to the resounding 
success of the GATT-WTO system has been the leadership that the United States has 
provided.  There is no doubt that the United States saw a rules-based trading system to its 
advantage.  Even so, it could have taken a narrow and short-term view of what was good 
for it and chosen to engage in market access agreements with smaller groups of countries 
adhering to strict reciprocity.  Like Europe, it could have also chosen to engage in small 
regional arrangements of its own.  Instead, it took a wider and longer-term view of what 
was beneficial and went for a non-discriminatory trade regime that nevertheless 
accommodated the formation of free trade areas and customs unions.  It also 
accommodated the demands of the developing countries for special and differential 
treatment and carried them along as GATT members rather than insist on full reciprocity 
from the beginning and risk pushing them out of the system.  It remained wedded to the 
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principle of the Most Favored Nation even though the developing countries had opted out 
of trade negotiations during the first four decades.  
 For a solution to be viable, a necessary condition is for the United States to return 
to its leadership role.  Recent events have brought home in sharp relief that the European 
Union, the only other entity in the GATT-WTO system with economic size and per-
capita income comparable to the United States is utterly incapable of providing such 
leadership.  As Jagdish Bhagwati has pointed out to me in private communications and 
conversations, when the United States imposed the tariffs on steel and aluminum, the 
reaction of European Union was to immediately seek exemption for itself.  In the rush to 
protect its narrow and short-term interest, it did not occur to its leadership that the United 
States tariffs struck at the very heart of the multilateral trading system.  Rather than lead 
the rest of the GATT-WTO membership into confronting the United States and force a 
negotiated solution to the U.S. complaints, it was willing to let the system be damaged as 
long as it got an exemption from the tariffs.  Japan and Canada, the other two members of 
the old Quad, behaved exactly similarly. After the United States refused the exemption, 
the European Union did its equivalent retaliation and then sent Jean-Claude Juncker, the 
President of the European Commission, to the United States to seek a bilateral deal for 
itself. 
 China is the only other country at present that could provide a leadership role in 
protecting the multilateral system of which it has been arguably the greatest beneficiary.  
One would think that with the largest share in the world merchandise trade, it would have 
the greatest stake in preserving and promoting the system.  But, alas, it has emerged as an 
aggressive and belligerent power that works in narrow self-interest rather than a 
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constructive and cooperative world leader that helps promote and preserve global 
institutions.  Its aggressive posturing has been amply on display in its dealings in the 
South China Sea as well as the Belt and Road Initiative. 
 From being a world power, which once saw great benefit to it from building an 
open world trading system, the United States today sees itself as a victim of that same 
system.  It is aggressively seeking redress from other large economies, most notably 
China and the European Union.  These latter are unable or unwilling to deliver, which has 
now resulted in aggressive unilateral actions by it. 
 To seek solution, we need to first understand the fundamental concerns of the 
United States and then ask whether they can be satisfactorily addressed. In my 
understanding, three asymmetries, all of them having a strong China angle, are at the 
heart of the United States dissatisfaction with the current system.  The asymmetries are: 
• There are large imbalances in the external accounts with the United States 
exhibiting large deficits in the trade and current accounts overall as well as 
bilaterally with the European Union and China.  
• The average level of protection in many large developing countries that have 
experienced increased prosperity in recent decades remains significantly higher 
than in the United States.  The United States finds this particularly problematic 
in the case of China.  
• Internal structure and rules including the heavy presence of public sector 
enterprises (PSEs), intellectual property protection, and interventions by the state 
on behalf of domestic firms in relations to foreign firms in China work against 
the United States’ interests. 
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• The United States also feels that the WTO as an institution has been ineffective 
in protecting its interests.   
Consider the difficulties in addressing each of these asymmetries in short to medium 
terms within the existing system. 
5.1. External Imbalances 
 One of the key concerns of the United States has been its large external account 
deficit.  This is probably the most difficult complaint to address, especially in the short 
term.  Even in a medium term it can be addressed only partially.  The problem is that 
what happens to the external imbalance is intimately related to what happens to the 
internal balance.  In particular the following two identities must hold at all times for 
every country: 
(1) (I-S) + (G-T) ≡ CAD ≡ K 
Here I denote investment, S savings, G government spending, T total revenue, CAD 
current account deficit and K net capital inflow from abroad.  The first identity says that 
the sum of investment-savings gap and fiscal deficit must be financed by an equivalent 
current-account deficit.  The second identity says that the current account deficit is 
identically equal to capital-account surplus.   
 According to the first identity, a country that does not save enough to finance its 
investment and runs large fiscal deficits cannot escape current-account deficit.  Stated 
differently, if the investment demand plus government spending exceed revenues plus 
domestic savings, the gap must be financed by borrowing abroad.  But net borrowing 
abroad will inevitably translate in an equivalent net spending on foreign goods and 
services, meaning an equivalent excess of imports over exports. 
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 Effectively, thus, the solution to the external imbalance of the United States lies at 
home.  The United States has specifically targeted China’s external account surplus but 
the reality is that even if the latter entirely eliminates its current account surplus, it will 
not eliminate the current account deficit of the United States.  As long as the imbalance 
between investment plus government spending and savings plus taxes is unchanged in 
the United States, its current account deficit will remain unchanged.  Elimination of the 
Chinese surplus will simply be reflected in equivalent increase in external surpluses of 
other countries.  For instance, cuts in the Chinese exports of apparel may simply be 
replaced by increased apparel exports by Bangladesh and Vietnam with no net change in 
the United States apparel imports.  It is only if all trading partners of the United States 
taken together fully balance the sum of their external accounts can they deliver on 
bringing balance to the external account of the United States.  Such coordination is 
impossible in practice. 
 The external imbalance problem posed by the United States is complicated by two 
additional factors.  First, unlike in the past, it is now focused on cutting the merchandise 
trade deficit.  This is even more difficult since the United States has a comparative 
advantage in services exports.  As such, even as its internal balance improves leading to 
an improvement in the current account, it will likely occur through improvement in net 
services balance than net merchandise trade balance.  
 Second, the United States also seeks external balance on a bilateral basis.  This 
makes matters far more difficult.  Any efforts to force balance with a handful of trading 
partners even if successful can readily result in imbalance with countries outside the 
targeted group. 
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 As far as the Chinese surpluses are concerned, past experiences of successful 
developing countries such a South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore tell us that once per-
capita incomes reach a comfortable level, consumption begins to rise rapidly with the 
savings rate declining.  The same process is now under way in China but can possibly be 
sped up. But it is difficult to say if this rebalancing in China would also produce 
rebalancing of the external account of the United States. 
5.2. Asymmetric Levels of Protection 
 In the early decades, the developed countries had accepted the higher levels of 
protection in the developing countries.  In the multilateral context, they required the 
latter to begin liberalizing their trade policies beginning with only the Uruguay Round 
negotiations.  In these negotiations, reductions were applied to bound rates.  In so far as 
most of the developing countries had not bound any of their tariff rates in the past, they 
could begin negotiations from arbitrarily chosen rates.  The formulaic tariff reductions 
that were negotiated did cut the high tariff rates more than low tariff rates.  But with the 
initial discrepancy being large, the reductions still left the developing country bound 
rates well above those of the developed countries.  Only in the case of China, which 
entered the WTO in 2001, the developed countries could force it to bind its tariffs at 
applied rates as a part of their entry conditions.  Nevertheless, despite liberalizing 
obligations undertaken as a part of the entry conditions, Chinese tariffs remain higher 
than those of the developed countries.  
 During the last two decades, most developing countries have undertaken trade 
liberalization on a unilateral basis.  As a result, their applied tariffs are significantly 
lower than their bound tariffs.  But these applied tariffs remain significantly higher than 
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the bound and applied rates in the developed countries.  As a part of the Doha Round 
negotiations, the United States tried to bridge the gap by making demands of substantial 
reductions by the developing countries.  But these efforts did not succeed since 
negotiations require a balance of concessions on the margin.  Even if formulaic 
reductions provide for larger reductions in higher tariffs, they fail to harmonize absolute 
levels of tariffs across countries.  For many developing countries, formulaic reductions 
can fall short of their applied tariffs leading the United States to conclude that such 
reductions do not result in any additional market access.  At the same time, the 
developing countries take the view that concessions are to be granted on the bound rates 
and they are offering their fair share of them. 
5.3. Internal Policies and Regulations  
 The United States (along with the European Union and Japan) also argues that 
China has failed to live up to its commitments made at the time of entry into the WTO.  
The report “2017 Report to the Congress on China’s WTO Compliance,” issued by the 
USTR in January 2018, states that despite constant high-level engagement with China 
since its entry into the WTO, nothing more than “incremental market access 
improvements or the repeal or modification of problematic Chinese measures that should 
never have been issued in the first place” has been achieved.11  The report goes on to 
note that despite repeated assurances at the highest levels by China, its regulatory 
authorities “do not allow U.S. companies to make their own decisions about technology 
transfer and the assignment or licensing of intellectual property rights, but instead 
                                                
11 United States Trade Representative (2018a). 
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continue to require or pressure foreign companies to transfer technology as a condition 
for securing investment or other approval.” The report summarizes the situation thus, 
Other examples could be given, but there can be no serious question about the 
underlying dynamic. China has shown a willingness to take modest steps to 
address isolated issues, and it will sometimes make broader commitments when 
pressed at very high levels, but it is not prepared to follow through on significant 
commitments or to make fundamental changes to its trade and investment regime.  
China is determined to maintain the state’s leading role in the economy and to 
continue to pursue industrial policies that promote, guide and support domestic 
industries while simultaneously and actively seeking to impede, disadvantage and 
harm their foreign counterparts, even though this approach is incompatible with 
the market-based approach expressly envisioned by WTO members and contrary 
to the fundamental principles running throughout the many WTO agreements. 
Based on assessments along these lines, the United States, European Union and Japan 
have decided not to give China the market economy status, which was due to it on 
December 11, 2016, fifteen years after it had joined the WTO.  China has challenged the 
decision in the WTO.  Once again, we have an impasse within the system. 
5.4. WTO and the United States Trade Interests 
 The United States also contends that the WTO as an institution is unable to 
protect its interests.  The dissatisfaction relates to both the outcomes of disputes involving 
the United States and the rules, which it views as constraining its ability to take actions 
necessary to protect its economic interests. These views find explicit expression in the 
recent “2018 Trade Policy Agenda and 2017 Annual Report of the President of the 
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United States on the Trade Agreements Program” to the Congress.12  Regarding the 
dispute settlement rulings, the report says when the WTO dispute settlement body 
functions according to agreed upon rules, it serves as an important tool to protect trading 
rights of member countries. “However, the United States has been raising its concerns for 
well over a decade that a number of WTO dispute settlement reports have not followed 
those rules.” The report goes on to state, “Concerns abound that dispute reports have 
added to or diminished rights or obligations in varied areas, such as subsidies, 
antidumping duties, and countervailing duties; standards (under the TBT Agreement); 
and safeguards.” 
 In the Executive Summary, the report expresses frustration with the constraints 
that WTO rules impose on the ability of the United States to protect its commercial 
interests. Of particular importance is the following statement: 
Instead of constraining market distorting countries like China, the WTO has in 
some cases given them an unfair advantage over the United States and other 
market based economies. Instead of promoting more efficient markets, the WTO 
has been used by some Members as a bulwark in defense of market access 
barriers, dumping, subsidies, and other market distorting practices. The United 
States will not allow the WTO – or any other multilateral organization – to 
prevent us from taking actions that are essential to the economic well-being of the 
American people. [Emphasis added] 
Initially, the United States expressed its dissatisfaction with the WTO dispute settlement 
body through a denial of approval of WTO appellate body judges.  As a result, several 
vacancies remain unfilled currently with the institution unable to discharge its functions 
                                                
12 United States Trade Representative (2018b). 
 34 
smoothly. More recently, as the above quote illustrates, the administration has expressed 
its willingness to take actions to protect the United States interests even if those actions 
violate the WTO rules. Steel and aluminum tariffs and Section 301 tariffs against China 
have been imposed in violation of the spirit and arguably even the letter of the WTO law.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
 Given the polarization that currently exists, there are no obvious solutions that can 
return the system to status quo.  While the United States and European Union have 
tentatively agreed to work together, it remains to be seen whether they make genuine 
progress or the former returns to its original threats of imposing additional tariffs on auto 
and other imports from the latter.  In regards to the United States and China, they remain 
firmly locked in a tariff war with near certainty that more shots will be fired in the near 
future. 
 A Panglossian optimist may offer the following optimistic scenario. As the 
current trade war progresses, dislocations of supply chains and associated jobs and output 
losses will lead political leadership and public to realize that trade and open markets are 
not the enemy they thought; instead, they are the source of prosperity.  The damage may 
teach them what reasoning and analysis could not.   
 Small, localized acts of protectionism can give the impression that it is beneficial 
overall.  This is because the positive impact of increased protection in one or two sectors 
is visible in terms of improved prospects of those sectors while the damage, which is 
spread throughout the economy, is invisible.  But the damage becomes a lot more visible 
when acts of protectionism are spread throughout the economy and, more importantly, 
accompanied by retaliatory actions by partner countries.  In this Panglossian scenario, 
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after feuding for a year or two, the participating countries would return to the negotiating 
table and restore status quo.  If the Republican Party does poorly in the elections in 
coming November, chances of this scenario playing out improve.  
 A variation on this scenario is that the current impasse has resulted from a rigid 
position taken by President Trump.  In a little more than two years, there will be another 
presidential election and hopefully a new occupant of the White House.  In all likelihood, 
the new president would opt for greater continuity with pre-Trump history of the United 
States’ trade policy and therefore more inclined to restore the WTO and the trading 
system to their original positions.  Having experienced the damage caused by the trade 
war in the intervening years, it is likely that other major players in the trading system 
such as the European Union and China would also adopt more conciliatory positions in 
two years time. 
 While these scenarios or some variations of them may obtain in the next two to 
three years, the risks of continued disruption can hardly be ruled out.  As described in the 
previous section, the dissatisfactions of the United States with the current system and 
trade outcomes it has produced are wide and deep.  There is no easy way to eliminate the 
asymmetries the country sees in the short to medium run.  And it will be politically 
difficult for the future leadership to return to business as usual without showing some 
progress in containing the asymmetries.  
 At the same time, the wide differences between the United States and China, an 
emerging aggressive power, will not go away easily.  Indeed, as other larger developing 
countries such as India and Brazil gain economic heft, challenges similar to those 
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currently originating in China would arise.  The road to bringing order to the trading 
system is likely to be rough. 
 At one time, it had seemed that even if we do not make major progress toward 
liberalization under the WTO auspices, what has been achieved so far could be preserved, 
with the WTO successfully maintaining a liberal trading environment.  But this scenario 
now appears less and less likely to obtain.  More likely, we are entering a world much 
like the one we confronted during the inter-war period.  While we may not be in danger 
of resurrecting the kind of protectionist regime that existed at the end of the Second 
World War, some retreat from the current liberal rules can hardly be ruled out.   
 It is also likely that regional trade agreements in which countries can choose trade 
partners as per their comfort will come to dominate the system with the WTO taking a 
backseat.  If so the fears many of us had expressed that the PTAs would prove stumbling 
blocks rather than building blocks of an open multilateral trading system would have 
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Simple average Duty-free Duties > 15 % 






 In %   Share of HS 6 digit subheadings in per cent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
North	America	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Canada                                                                                                                                                 99.7 5.2 2.1 38.1 78.8 6.8 6.1 
USA 100.0 3.2 3.1 49.0 49.3 2.4 2.2 
Europe	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
European Union  100 3.9 4.2 28.9 27.6 1.0 1.5 
Norway                                                                                                                                                 100 3.0 0.5 51.7 95.5 0.0 0.0 
Switzerland                                                                                                                                            99.7 1.9 1.8 17.9 24.3 1.1 1.0 
Turkey                                                                                                                                                 43.0 17.3 5.8 3.3 24.4 20.4 6.1 
Latin America 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Argentina                                                                                                                                              100 31.7 14.3 0 5.5 98.2 39.9 
Brazil                                                                                                                                                 100 30.8 13.9 0.7 5.2 96.5 38.6 
Chile                                                                                                                                                  100 25.0 6.0 0.0 0.8 100.0 0 
Colombia                                                                                                                                               100 34.6 4.5 2.4 55.3 97.6 0.4 
Mexico                                                                                                                                                 100 34.8 5.8 0.3 54.2 99.2 7.5 
Indo-Pacific 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Australia                                                                                                                                              96.7 10.7 2.7 21.0 46.9 14.7 0.1 
China                                                                                                                                                  100 9.1 8.8 6.6 7.1 13.3 11.9 
India                                                                                                                                                  70.5 34.6 10.7 2.6 2.7 67.5 9.4 
Indonesia                                                                                                                                              95.8 35.5 8.0 2.8 13.8 89.3 9.8 
Japan                                                                                                                                                  99.6 2.5 2.5 55.9 54.9 0.7 0.7 
South Korea 94.1 9.8 6.8 18.3 16.6 11.9 3.9 
Africa 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Egypt                                                                                                                                                  99.3 27.4 11.8 2.2 11.1 70.0 20.2 
Kenya                                                                                                                                                  2.6 58.5 11.6 0 41.2 2.6 37.9 
Nigeria                                                                                                                                                6.8 49.7 11.5 0 3.0 6.8 36.6 
South Africa  93.4 15.7 7.5 13.0 63.2 33.8 20.2 
Tanzania                                                                                                                                               0.3 120.0 11.6 0 41.3 0.2 37.9 
        
Note: All MFN rates relate to year 2017. 




Table 2: tariffs on Agricultural Products in Selected Countries 
 Simple average Duty-free Non ad valorem 
duties 
Duties > 15 % 








   Share of HS 6 digit subheadings in per cent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
North	America	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Canada                                                                                                                                                 16.0 15.7    46.1 68.5 19.5 11.1 8.9 8.9 
USA     4.9     5.3    30.2    30.6    41.3    41.7     5.5     5.9 
Europe	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
European Union     11.8    10.8    31.4    31.7    31.7    32.3    23.9    21.4 
Norway                                                                                                                                                 133.5    42.1 28.0    51.7 66.7 43.3    48.4    38.7 
Switzerland                                                                                                                                            45.5 35.2    22.0 29.6 78.0    70.4 40.3 28.5
Turkey                                                                                                                                                    61.8 43.1 0.0    16.9 0 5.7    87.7 66.0 
Latin America 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Argentina                                                                                                                                              32.4 10.3     0.1 7.4 0 0 95.2    15.3 
Brazil                                                                                                                                                    35.4    10.2 2.7     7.2 0 0    95.7 14.7 
Chile                                                                                                                                                  26.1     6.0 0 0       0 0 100.0       0 
Colombia                                                                                                                                               91.5    14.3 0     0.4 0 15.8  99.8     3.6 
Mexico                                                                                                                                                 45.0 13.5 0.4 22.2     7.3 4.7 95.4    38.6 
Indo-Pacific 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Australia                                                                                                                                                  3.4     1.2 31.3    76.8 1.7 0.9     3.5 0.3 
China                                                                                                                                                  15.7    15.6 6.0 7.2       0 0.3 35.5    35.2 
India                                                                                                                                                    113.5 32.8 0     5.1 0.3     0.3 98.4 81.5 
Indonesia                                                                                                                                              47.1 8.7       0 8.4 0     1.4 99.4 9.6 
Japan                                                                                                                                                     18.0 13.3 34.1    36.4 15.1    11.6 22.9 20.8 
South Korea    57.9    56.9     2.2     5.5     5.2     3.2    75.5    53.1 
Africa 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Egypt                                                                                                                                                  91.3    63.0 0 15.9     1.6 1.3 68.6    29.5 
Kenya                                                                                                                                                  100.0    20.2 0 15.3       0 1.2 99.9    68.5 
Nigeria                                                                                                                                                150.0 15.7 0 0       0 0 99.9    53.6 
South Africa     39.1     8.5    22.5    46.0       0    13.7    72.0    22.1 
Tanzania                                                                                                                                                 120.0 20.5 0    15.1 0 1.2 99.9 68.5 
Note: All MFN rates relate to year 2017. 





Table 3: Countries experiencing rapid growth alongside liberal trade policies 
Country	Name	 1994-2013	 1994-2003	 2004-13	
Africa	 	 	 	
Botswana	 4.6	 4.8	 4.5	
Burkina	Faso	 6.0	 6.0	 6.0	
Cabo	Verde	 7.9	 10.6	 5.3	
Ethiopia	 7.5	 4.0	 11.0	
Ghana	 5.9	 4.3	 7.6	
Kenya	 3.9	 2.5	 5.3	
Malawi	 4.1	 2.8	 5.4	
Mozambique	 7.3	 7.4	 7.2	
Namibia	 4.3	 3.3	 5.3	
Rwanda	 6.8	 6.0	 7.7	
Sierra	Leone	 3.8	 2.1	 5.5	
Tanzania	 5.8	 4.7	 7.0	
Timor-Leste	 7.4	 6.2	 7.9	
Uganda	 6.9	 6.9	 7.0	
Asia	 	 	 	
Bangladesh	 5.6	 5.0	 6.2	
Bhutan	 7.3	 7.0	 7.6	
Cambodia	 7.7	 7.5	 7.9	
China	 9.8	 9.5	 10.2	
India	 6.8	 6.1	 7.5	
Indonesia	 4.6	 3.4	 5.8	
Lao	PDR	 7.1	 6.4	 7.8	
Malaysia	 5.3	 5.6	 5.0	
Maldives	 6.8	 10.1	 6.1	
Mongolia	 6.5	 3.7	 9.2	
Myanmar	 9.8	 9.4	 13.6	
Philippines	 4.6	 3.9	 5.4	
Singapore	 5.9	 5.4	 6.4	
Sri	Lanka	 5.5	 4.5	 6.5	
Viet	nam	 6.8	 7.3	 6.4	
Latin	America	 	 	 	
Chile	 4.6	 4.7	 4.4	
Costa	Rica	 4.5	 4.4	 4.7	
Cuba	 4.5	 3.4	 5.9	
Dominican	Republic	 5.1	 5.0	 5.2	
Peru	 5.4	 4.3	 6.4	
Uruguay	 3.3	 1.0	 5.6	
 
